The roots of Haiti’s current catastrophe stretch back years, but the collapse of state authority in Port-au-Prince has accelerated with alarming speed. By now, anti-government forces are estimated to control up to 90 percent of the capital. That figure alone explains why ordinary citizens have begun forming armed vigilante groups. They call it bwa kale.
The government, struggling to maintain a grip since 2020, has lost ground steadily. Armed groups now hold vast swaths of the city. The police and security forces cannot push them back. Into that vacuum stepped the bwa kale movement — citizens who decided the state could not protect them and took up weapons themselves.
Two major coalitions dominate the fighting. The Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies — known as FRG9 or simply G9 — and the G-Pèp group have been the primary drivers of instability. They fight each other. They fight the government. Civilians are caught between them. The emergence of bwa kale adds a third, unpredictable force: a population that has stopped waiting for help.
The international community has watched the deterioration with growing alarm. On October 2, 2023, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 2699. That resolution authorized a multinational security support mission led by Kenya. Details of the mission’s scope and objectives remain unclear. What is clear is that the Security Council judged the situation dire enough to warrant foreign intervention.
Kenya’s leadership of the mission raises questions. The country has experience with peacekeeping but faces its own internal security challenges. How a Kenyan-led force will operate in a city where 90 percent of territory is contested is not yet spelled out. The resolution passed, but the hard work of deployment and coordination lies ahead.
The bwa kale movement did not arise in a vacuum. It is a response to years of failure. The government could not secure neighborhoods. The police could not hold streets. Gangs expanded their control block by block. Eventually, some residents decided that action, however dangerous, was better than passivity. The vigilantes are not organized like the G9 or G-Pèp. They are more diffuse, more spontaneous. That makes them harder to control and harder to predict.
Port-au-Prince has become a city of armed factions. The government holds some ground. The G9 and G-Pèp hold more. The bwa kale movement holds pockets. No single group commands enough force to end the conflict. The fighting grinds on, neighborhood by neighborhood.
The United Nations resolution signals that outside powers see no quick fix. A multinational mission may bring some stability, but it will not erase the underlying causes of the conflict. The gangs did not appear overnight. The government’s weakness did not develop suddenly. The vigilante movement did not emerge without reason. All of it built up over years of neglect, corruption, and violence.
For now, the trajectory of the conflict depends on the interplay between these forces. The G9 and G-Pèp will not disarm voluntarily. The bwa kale movement will not disband because a foreign mission arrives. The government will not magically regain control of 90 percent of its capital. Resolution 2699 is a step, but the road ahead is long and uncertain.
