The coming weeks in a London courtroom will not be about how the fire spread. That part is settled. The inquiry’s first phase, finished in 2019, traced the path: a fridge-freezer fire on the fourth floor, flames through a window, then the external cladding system alight. Seventy-two people died. Seventy more were hurt. The second phase, restarting 24 February 2020, asks a different question: who decided to sell and install that cladding, and what did they know?
Sir Martin Moore-Bick, the inquiry chairman, has already flagged the stakes. On 30 January he wrote to Attorney General Geoffrey Cox requesting no immunity for witnesses. His warning was blunt. Employees of the manufacturers and sellers of the cladding materials, he said, when asked about “how they came to market potentially dangerous products,” would likely invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. That letter, made public 12 February, lists suspected offences under three acts: the Fraud Act 2006, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, and the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.
The Crown Prosecution Service is watching. A spokesperson confirmed a dedicated team is reviewing evidence as it is disclosed. Charges remain a live option. That is not a hypothetical. It is a warning to every executive whose company touched the Grenfell refurbishment.
Internal documents already in the inquiry’s hands show alarm inside two key suppliers. Emails from insulation maker Celotex and cladding supplier Arconic reveal internal concern about the products that went onto the 24-storey block. Polyethylene-filled panels and polyisocyanurate foam. The combination that turned a kitchen fire into a tower-wide inferno.
This phase drills into board-level decisions. Not site-level mistakes. Not a workman fitting the wrong panel. The inquiry wants to know who signed off the marketing claims, who approved the sales pitch, who decided that a product with a flammable core was safe for a residential high-rise. The fraud and conspiracy evidence that Moore-Bick described to Cox suggests prosecutors believe those decisions may have been criminal.
For the families of the 72 dead, this is the phase that matters. The first phase explained the physics. This one assigns responsibility. And it does so in a forum where every word can be used in a criminal trial. Witnesses cannot be compelled to incriminate themselves. That is why Moore-Bick pushed for no immunity. If a witness takes the Fifth, the public sees that too. Silence in this context is its own kind of testimony.
The law gives prosecutors options. The Fraud Act covers false representations. The Health and Safety Act covers failures that expose people to risk. The Corporate Manslaughter Act covers management failures that cause death. Any of those could apply to a company that marketed a product it knew was dangerous, or to a contractor that installed it without proper checks.
Nobody expects charges to be filed the day the hearings resume. The CPS team is collecting evidence. The inquiry will produce a report. Then the prosecutors decide. But the letter from Moore-Bick to Cox makes clear that the evidence already in hand is serious enough to trigger a formal warning. That is a high bar.
The refurbishment of Grenfell Tower was not a small job. It involved multiple contractors, multiple suppliers, multiple layers of oversight. The inquiry will now test each layer. Who knew the cladding was flammable? Who knew the insulation was combustible? Who signed off the design? Who certified the installation? The answers will determine whether anyone faces a criminal trial.
For now, the focus is on the companies. Celotex. Arconic. Their internal emails are already public. Their employees will be called to give evidence. The inquiry chairman has made clear that they will be asked hard questions about how they came to market potentially dangerous products. And the Attorney General has been told that the answers may be used in court.
