WASHINGTON, July 10 — Against this backdrop of shifting energy alliances and transatlantic tension, the United States is weighing a new tariff mechanism aimed at Russian oil that would operate through a technical architecture few outside trade law and sanctions enforcement have yet examined. The proposal would not simply ban imports—a step already taken in 2022—but would target Russian crude sold onward to third countries, using secondary sanctions to penalise the buyers. Tariffs are taxes on imports, typically set as a percentage of the product’s value.
The U.S. president has authority under the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 122) or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose tariffs for national security reasons. These statutes would form the legal foundation for any new action, according to the technical analysis.
The numbers tell a stark story. In 2021, the United States imported about 672,000 barrels per day of Russian crude oil. After the 2022 ban, those imports fell to near zero.
The proposed tariffs would not resurrect that trade. Instead, they would target Russian oil sold to third countries, using secondary sanctions to penalise buyers.
What is at stake is the enforcement architecture. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) would be responsible for implementing the tariff at the border. But since the oil would not physically enter the United States, the real work would fall to the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
OFAC would police secondary sanctions—penalties applied to foreign entities that purchase Russian oil, even if those transactions occur entirely outside U.S. jurisdiction. In the corridors of trade law, this dual-track approach is both novel and legally contested. The IEEPA has historically been used for asset freezes and financial sanctions, not for tariff imposition.
Section 122 of the Trade Act has rarely been invoked. The combination of tariff law and secondary sanctions creates a hybrid mechanism that would test the boundaries of executive authority under existing statutes.
The wider picture involves a European perspective that has long watched Washington’s energy policy with a mixture of dependence and unease. European Union member states, having endured their own energy crisis following the 2022 invasion, have imposed multiple sanctions packages on Russian oil, including a price cap mechanism coordinated with the G7. A unilateral U.S. tariff on Russian oil sold to third countries could either reinforce that price cap or complicate it, depending on how the secondary sanctions are calibrated.
The technical briefing makes clear that enforcement would require close coordination between CBP and OFAC, two agencies with different institutional cultures and legal mandates. CBP operates at ports of entry, inspecting goods and collecting duties.
OFAC works through financial institutions, freezing assets and designating entities. Making the two systems work in tandem for a tariff that never touches U.S. soil would be unprecedented. Against this backdrop, the historical context matters.
The United States has used secondary sanctions before—against Iran, most notably, and against entities doing business with North Korea and Syria. But those sanctions targeted financial transactions and specific sectors, not a broad commodity like crude oil. Extending the secondary sanctions model to a tariff on Russian oil would represent a significant expansion of the tool.
The proposed mechanism would likely set the tariff as a percentage of the value of each barrel of Russian crude sold to a third country. The buyer, not the seller, would face the penalty—denial of access to the U.S. financial system, asset freezes, or designation on the sanctions list.
This shifts the burden from producer to purchaser, a design choice that reflects the reality that Russia’s oil is now flowing largely to non-Western markets. What is at stake, ultimately, is whether this technical architecture can achieve its stated goal: reducing Russian oil revenue without triggering a spike in global energy prices or alienating key U.S. partners in Asia and the Middle East. The legal foundations are established.
The agencies are named. The enforcement mechanisms exist on paper.
Whether they can be made to work in practice is the question that now confronts policymakers in Washington and their counterparts in European capitals. The wider picture includes the reaction of major oil buyers. India, now the world’s third-largest oil importer, has become Russia’s largest customer for seaborne crude since the 2022 invasion.
China has also increased purchases. Both nations have resisted Western pressure to reduce their Russian oil imports, arguing that energy security requires diverse supply sources. A U.S. tariff with secondary sanctions would directly challenge that position.
In the corridors of international trade law, the proposal raises questions about WTO compatibility and the scope of national security exceptions. The United States has previously argued that measures taken under IEEPA and Section 122 are not subject to WTO dispute resolution because they involve national security.
That argument has been accepted in some cases and contested in others. The legal landscape remains uncertain. The technical analysis cites specific laws and agencies with precision.
The Trade Act of 1974 (Section 122) gives the president authority to impose temporary tariffs or quotas to address large and serious balance-of-payments deficits or to protect national security. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act allows the president to declare a national emergency and then block transactions, freeze assets, and regulate economic activity involving foreign entities.
Together, they provide the legal toolkit. Against this backdrop, the enforcement challenge is substantial. OFAC would need to identify and track transactions involving Russian crude oil sold to third countries, determine the value of each transaction, and then apply the tariff penalty.
This requires intelligence-sharing with allies, cooperation from financial institutions, and a system for verifying the origin and price of crude oil cargoes—a notoriously opaque market.
