WASHINGTON, July 8 — The U.S. intelligence community continues to assess that Iran seeks retaliation against former American officials, a strategic calculus that has reshaped security protocols and diplomatic posture since the 2020 assassination of Qasem Soleimani. The calculus has been consistent across multiple administrations. U.S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, have determined that Iran’s leadership views revenge as a matter of institutional honor.
In 2022, the ODNI disclosed an alleged plot by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to assassinate former President Donald Trump, alongside other former officials such as Mike Pompeo and John Bolton. Those assessments were built on intercepted communications and human intelligence.
What this signals is a persistent, state-directed threat that the intelligence community does not believe has diminished over time. The U.S. State Department has offered rewards of up to $10 million for information on Iranian assassination plots. That reward structure underscores the seriousness with which Washington treats these threats.
By 2023, the FBI reported an increase in both Iranian cyber and physical threats directed at U.S. officials, indicating that Tehran’s operational tempo has not slackened. Strategically, Iran’s approach blends deniability with deterrence.
The use of proxies and cyber operations allows Tehran to apply pressure without triggering a direct military confrontation. Yet the intelligence community’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment explicitly highlighted Iran as a persistent threat to U.S. interests, a designation that carries implications for force posture and diplomatic engagement. The broader stakes extend beyond individual security.
A successful assassination of a former U.S. official would represent a profound breach of post-9/11 norms, potentially triggering a escalatory cycle that neither Washington nor Tehran wants. The intelligence community’s warnings are designed to prevent that outcome. Since 2022, the U.S. has increased security for former officials, with protection for Trump alone costing an estimated $2 million per month.
That figure reflects the resource intensity of defending against a determined state actor with multiple avenues of attack — from armed drones to cyber intrusions to proxy operatives crossing land borders.
Intelligence Gaps and Operational Challenges
The threat is not static. The ODNI’s disclosures in 2022 revealed specific plotting, but the intelligence community has acknowledged that Iran’s tradecraft has grown more sophisticated. Intercepted communications and human intelligence remain the primary tools for tracking these plots, but both methods have limitations.
Iran has learned from past compromises, adjusting its operational security accordingly. What this signals to analysts is a long-term commitment.
Iran’s leadership has not abandoned the goal of revenge; it has simply become more patient and more careful. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment framed this as a generational challenge, one that will outlast any single administration.
Looking Forward
The coming months will test whether the intelligence community’s warnings translate into effective prevention. The U.S. has invested heavily in protective measures, but the threat environment continues to evolve. Iran’s cyber capabilities, in particular, present a growing challenge that traditional security protocols may not fully address.
For the former officials most directly targeted, the calculus is personal. The intelligence community’s assessments leave little room for doubt: the threat is real, it is ongoing, and it is unlikely to dissipate without a fundamental shift in Iran’s strategic calculations.
That shift has not come.
